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Abstract 
This article estimates the elasticity of participation in the 
workforce of married women with respect to the rate of income tax. 
We take advantage of the French joint income tax system and a large 
tax returns data base to implement a regression discontinuity design. 
 
The negative impact of tax rates on participation is generally strong. 
This elasticity describes a U-curve along the distribution of income 
per consumption unit. Participation is more elastic at the lower end of 
the income distribution. Participation elasticity increases with the 
wife's age and the age difference between the spouses. It is even 
greater when the husband is retired. An increase of this elasticity 
occurs after the third child and subsequent but not for the two first 
children. When these two first children are young, the elasticity of 
their mother is even lower.  
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1. Introduction 
Understanding the behavior of married women in the labor market 
matters both for microeconomic theory and public policy. It sheds 
light upon differences or inequalities between men and women both 
as couples and with regard to professional opportunities. While the 
gender gap in remuneration is still significant (e.g. Altonji and Blank 
1999, Blau and Kahn 2000, Bertrand et al. 2009, Bertrand 2011), 
there are also major differences in workforce participation, and not 
only because of differences in expected wages. These behavioral 
differences can be related to many factors, one of which is family 
structure and child care (e.g. Angrist and Evans 1998), reflected by 
the importance of access to child care facilities and their cost (e.g. 
Lefebvre and Merrigan 2008, Baker et al. 2008). 
Fiscal policy also plays an important role for the supply of labor, and 
the aim of the present paper is to precisely assess this role, 
disentangling it from other motive of (non-)participation to the 
workforce. Taking advantage of the joint taxation of the French 
income tax system, it implements a regression discontinuity design to 
estimate the elasticity of married women’s labor supply at the 
extensive margins with respect to the participation tax rate. 
Men and women behaving differently as regards workforce 
participation may have a significant impact on the determination of 
optimal fiscal policies. Alesina et al. (2007) argued that an income 
tax schedule should not solely depend on the level of income, but 
also should take into account the gender and marital status of the 
person being taxed. They concluded that if the disincentive for 
women to work is to be reduced then their tax rate should be reduced. 
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In this respect the fiscal treatment of married couples in France may 
prove counterproductive. While married men and women are treated 
symmetrically, this system of joint taxation – compared with 
individual taxation – significantly reduces the tax paid on a husband's 
salary and increases the one paid by the wife once the couple adopts 
the stance that the husband is the principal wage earner then the wife 
opts to work, or not. Indeed, the mean of the two members is applied 
to the progressive tax schedules, and then the resulting income tax is 
doubled. Therefore, such joint taxation offers a reduction in tax paid 
by couples where partners have different income. If the husband is 
the only partner working, the household finances benefit from this 
reduction, but this benefit disappears as the wife's income increases. 
Hence this loss of fiscal benefit represents an excessive tax burden on 
married women's incomes. Despite this disincentive impact of joint 
taxation, it is maintained in France for equity motives: progressive 
taxation at the household level to tax in proportion of the ability to 
pay. 
This kind of taxation is subject to debate in the countries where it is 
set. According to Pearson and Blinder (2012), ten countries still 
implement this tax system
1
 among which France, Germany and the 
United-States, and several others have transferable allowances 
generating similar disincentives. The debate over shifting to 
individual taxation is now important in Germany. In the recent years, 
three simulations (Steiner and Wrohlich 2004, 2008, Fehr et al. 2013) 
evaluated ex ante the impact on women employment of such a tax 
reform. Thanks to reforms already which occurred in other countries, 
                                                          
1
 These countries are Estonia, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Ireland, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Switzerland and United-States. 
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some papers evaluated this impact ex post through natural 
experiment methodologies: LaLumia (2008) on US reform in 1948, 
Selin (2009) on Swedish reform in 1971 and Kalíšková (2013) on 
Czesch reform in 2005. These three double difference estimations 
found substantial impact, mainly on wives of wealthy husbands. 
The objective of the present paper is not only to evaluate the impact 
of this system on the participation of married women to the 
workforce. It is also to take advantage of joint taxation to estimate 
the labor supply of married women with regards to taxation. Indeed, 
it provides an innovative quasi-natural experiment framework to do 
it: according to assumption that wives' decision as regards to 
participation occurred after their husbands', the joint income tax 
system generates discontinuities in the participation tax rates faced 
by married women. This allows implementing regression 
discontinuity design estimations. The size of the data base allows 
implementing separate estimations for numerous sub-samples. 
Furthermore, thanks to discontinuities for very low income, the 
present paper estimates specifically the participation elasticity of 
women at the lower end of the income distribution, which proves 
very large. 
This paper contributes to the literature on labor supply behavior 
thanks to this empirical strategy and an original and precious tax 
return data base. The participation of married women in the 
workforce has already been discussed in other papers, in addition to 
those specifically evaluating joint taxation impacts. Blundell and 
Laisney (1988) and Dagsvik et al. (1988) estimated labor supply 
models using French data and deduced elasticities for the 
participation of married women in the workforce. Both found a 
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strong positive effect from net wages (which should correspond to a 
strongly negative effect of marginal income tax rates) and a weaker 
negative effect with respect to the wealth of the household. Blundell 
et al. (1998) applied natural experiment econometrics to fiscal reform 
in the 1980's in the UK and estimated a stronger negative impact for 
income on workforce participation of married women with children. 
These analyses are general estimations of the elasticity of the labor 
supply of married women at the extensive margin. They tacitly 
presume that different married women behave similarly on the labor 
market. The aim of the present analysis is to assess different 
elasticity of married women participation to the workforce for 
different socioeconomic categories of households. This is possible 
thanks to the large number of observations compiled on the data 
base: it contains a representative sample of 497,920 tax returns out of 
the 35,105,854 filed in 2006, with all the information declared but 
the names and addresses. 
Section 2 explains the French income tax system, which proves to be 
quite complicated, with a large number of exemptions, deductions 
and reductions. It focuses particularly on the joint taxation system. 
Considering that the ability to contribute to public finance should be 
measured at the household level, the sum of income of all the 
members of the household are taxed together. As average tax rate for 
households with the same income per consumption units is often 
lower for singles than for couples under individual taxation, the 
reverse is true under joint taxation. French tax system also has great 
impact on the participation tax rate of secondary earners, who are 
mainly the wives. 
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Section 3 presents the data used for the present econometrics. It 
consists in a very rich and original data base: a large sample of 
497,420 income tax returns files for 2006 personal income taxation 
of 2005 income. The weakness of the data base is the lack of 
variables not related with the calculation of income taxation, even if 
information on related variables is very precise. Its strength is the 
number and representativeness of observations – even for small 
socio-economic categories – allowing estimation differentiated by 
characteristics of households. Some descriptive statistics are also 
presented. 
Section 4 explains the identification strategy. It is shown 
theoretically and verified on data that the French joint income tax 
system creates discontinuities in the wives’ participation tax rates 
along the taxable income per tax unit minus the wife’s wages. This 
last variable is then chosen as assignment variable in the regression 
discontinuity design. The validity of this approach – the non-
manipulation of the assignment variable – is then confronted to 
literature results, theoretical arguments and empirical tests. Finally 
the estimation set up is detailed. 
Section 5 presents and interprets the results. The regression 
discontinuity design is implemented for the whole sample and on 
several subsamples in order to assess the differences in behavior of 
different kinds of married women. It is established that the elasticity 
of married women’s participation to the workforce with respect to tax 
rate describes a U-curve along the distribution of income per 
consumption unit – whatever asset returns only or all income but the 
women’s wage. In addition, this elasticity increases with the wife’s 
age and the age difference between the spouses. It is even greater 
 7 
   
when the husband is retired. Last, increase of this elasticity related to 
children appears only for the third and subsequent children. 
Reversely, mothers of one or two children are less elastic than other 
wives while their children are very young. 
Section 6 concludes, summarizes the results and compares them to 
the literature. The overall results are similar, which allows shedding 
light on one important contribution of the present paper: 
understanding the differences of behavior between different married 
women. Last, these results are exploited in order to evaluate the 
aftermath of joint taxation in terms of participation of married 
women on the labor market. 
 
2. The French joint income taxation system 
In France, with the exception of a few very unusual cases
2
, spousal 
incomes are jointly taxed, along with any income that the couple's 
children's might have (according to age and student status). The 
husband is called ``principal tax unit member’’ and the wife is called 
                                                          
2
 Four cases are possible for married individuals declaring separately: in its first 
paragraph, article 6 of the general tax code establishes that ``except when clauses 4 
and 5 apply, married people are subject to joint taxation on the incomes received 
by each of them as well as those of their children and dependents.'' The cases 
where this does not apply are given in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the same article: 
paragraph 4 establishes that ``spouses are subject to separate taxation: a. When 
their goods and chattels are separated and they do not live under the same roof; b. 
When in the case that they are physically separated or divorced, they have been 
authorized to have separate residences; c. When in the case of abandonment of the 
marital home by one or the other, they have established separate incomes'' and 
paragraph 5 discusses income taxation for the year during which the marriage is 
concluded. 
2014/03 
8 
 
the ``spouse’’: subsection 1 of article 6 of the general income tax 
code explains that ``this tax is administered in the name of the 
husband, preceded by the title `Mr or Mrs'.'' This administrative 
denomination of the husband as the head of the household for the tax 
services is not without economic significance.  It corresponds to the 
fact that for a large proportion of married couples, husbands are still 
primary earners and wives secondary earners. 
In addition to the husband and wife, the tax household is constituted 
of the dependent persons. They are mainly minor children but they 
also may be young adult children if still student, elderly or disabled 
adults. A number of tax units (quotient familial) is given to each tax 
household depending on its composition. Husband and wife each 
count as one unit, the first two dependent persons generally count as 
half a unit each, the third and subsequent count as one unit each (all 
cases are presented in table 1). 
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Table 1: Description of the French joint income tax system 
 
Notes: The first part of this table represents the number of family units attributed to 
a household in relation to its composition. Dependent people are mainly children, 
but they may also be elderly or handicapped adults.  This number of tax units then 
serves to calculate the household's joint tax, according to the marginal tax rate 
schedule presented in the second part of this table. The thresholds of the brackets 
are in euros. 
 
The number of family units per fiscal household 
 Number of dependent people 
Marital status 0 1 2 3 suppl. 
Couple (joint tax 
return) 
2 shares 2.5 3 4 +1 
Couple (separate tax 
return) 
1 1.5 2 3 +1 
Single 1 2 2.5 3.5 +1 
Widow 1 2.5 3 4 +1 
Schedule of marginal income tax rate for 
2005 income 
Tax bracket Marginal tax 
rate 
First bracket   0 4,412 0% 
Second bracket   4,412 8,677 6.83% 
Third bracket   8,677 15,274 19.14% 
Fourth bracket   15,274 24,731 28.26% 
Fifth bracket   24,731 40,241 37.38% 
Sixth bracket   40,241 49,624 42.62% 
Seventh bracket   49,624 … 48.09% 
2014/03 
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The income earned one year by all members of the tax household – 
net of social contributions, abatement, and tax deductions (the 
taxable income) – is added up and then divided by the number of tax 
units to determine the taxable income per tax unit taxed the following 
year. This taxable income per tax unit is taxed according to a 
progressive schedule (piecewise linear) constituted with 6 tax 
brackets in 2014 and with 7 tax brackets at the time of the data used 
for the present study: 2005. The tax schedule for 2005 income is 
presented in table 1. The tax schedule has been stable over the period 
before 2005 except that tax thresholds have been adjusted for 
inflation. Therefore, even though it is quite complicated, it is 
intuitively known by French taxpayers thanks to experience. It 
eventually changed significantly for the 2007 taxation of the 2006 
income. This is the reason why the case of the 2006 taxation of 2005 
income is chosen for the study. 
More precisely, let q denote the number of family units of a given 
household. Taxable income is Z=(1-s)Yw+Yo-D where Yw is the gross 
wages, s the social contributions, Yo the other income and D the tax 
deductions. Taxable income per family units z=Z/q is taxed 
according to the tax schedule T[.]: the 4,412 first euros of z are not 
taxed, the following 4,265 euros (8,677-4,412) taxed at marginal rate 
equals 6,83%, and so on… which gives the gross income tax per tax 
units T[z]. The gross income tax for the tax household is q.T[z] and 
the net income tax max(q.T[z]-R)-C where R are the total of tax 
reduction and C the total of tax credit. For 2005 income taxed in 
2006, fiscal expenditure on income tax (deduction, reduction and 
credit) amounted for 36 billion euros for actual income tax revenue 
of 58 billion euros (3% of GDP), according to the 2007 fiscal 
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assessment. Last, there exists a mechanism of tax diminishing for 
very low tax amount and a minimum of perception. 
Consequently, joint taxation diminishes the tax of households with 
more dependent persons: the tax schedule is progressive and so 
function T[.] is convex; hence, (q+1).T[Z/(q+1)]<q.T[Z/q]. This tax 
decrease is stronger for higher income households but there exists a 
ceiling of the tax advantage due to dependent persons. Compared to 
individual taxation, it also decreases taxation of couples with 
different incomes
3
. Always because of the convexity of T[.], 
2.T[Z/2]<T[a.Z]+T[(1-a).Z] when a is different to 1/2. As an 
example, let us consider a couple without dependent children whose 
taxable income is 20,000 euros. The taxable income per family unit 
is 10,000 euros. The unit and gross income tax are respectively 
(10,000-8,677)*0.1914+(8,677-4,412)*0.0683=544 and 544*2=1,088 
euros. A single with the same taxable income would pay (20,000-
15,274)*0.2826+(15,274-8,677)*0.1914+(8,677-
4,412)*0.0683=2,889 euros. 
 
                                                          
3
 However, some couples with similar low earnings may be disadvantaged by joint 
taxation, if they benefit individually but not jointly from the decôte mechanism or 
the minimum of perception. The amount of the disadvantage keeps low. 
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Figure 1: The principle of joint taxation 
 
 
Notes: It is assumed that the tax schedule is made of two brackets, the first one in 
light grey taxes income at low marginal rate and the second one, in dark grey taxes 
income at high marginal rate. The principle of joint taxation is to mutualize the low 
tax bracket of the members of the tax household. 
 
This may be intuitively understood looking at figure 1. Let us 
consider only two tax brackets. The rationale for progressivity is that 
first euros of income are more necessary than subsequent ones – due 
to marginally decreasing utility – and therefore gives to its owner a 
lower ability to contribute. Therefore, the first bracket gives to 
taxpayers an amount of income lightly taxed. With individual 
taxation each individual loads her individual low rate bracket, and 
subsequent euros of income are tax at the high marginal rate. But 
with joint taxation, if one member of the couple does not load fully 
her low rate bracket, the remaining right to be taxed at low rate is 
transferred to her spouse. Therefore, joint taxation is advantageous 
for couples compared to individual taxation, if this transfer happens, 
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that is if one member of the couple does not load the low rate 
brackets: if the incomes of the members of the couple are 
significantly different. 
The rationale for joint taxation is linked with equity: it is to consider 
that the members of a family share their household, and therefore that 
the ability to contribute should be understood at the family level. 
However, each member of the couple counts for one as there exist 
economies of scale in the couple’s necessary consumption. 
Therefore, joint taxation has the impact of taxing more single than 
couples with the same taxable income per consumption units (the 
usual way to compute consumption units is to give one unit for the 
first adult, half a unit for subsequent adults and 0.3 unit for children). 
This is shown in figure 2a which draws the average effective tax rate 
of the French legislation with respect to taxable income per 
consumption unit, for different household compositions. 
 
2014/03 
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Figure 2: Consequences of joint taxation 
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Notes: author calculation of income tax based on the French tax law for 2005 
income taxed in 2006, including earned income tax credit, décôte and minimum of 
perception mechanisms. Consumption units are one for the first adult, 0.5 for the 
second adult and 0.3 for each child. Primary earner average tax rate is calculated 
assuming secondary earner does not work. Secondary earner average tax rate is 
calculated assuming primary earner wage is equal to five times the minimum wage. 
 
Furthermore, even if formally symmetric, joint taxation actually 
creates a great difference of taxation between the members of the 
couple. Let us consider that the couple itself is asymmetric vis-à-vis 
the labor market, and more precisely that a primary earner works if 
he can and a secondary earner then decides whether or not to 
participate in the workforce. In that case, joint taxation grants a tax 
reduction to the primary income earner (before the decision of 
participation of the secondary earner). In addition, because this tax 
reduction shrinks as the secondary income earner's salary rises, 
secondary earners are double taxed by the direct marginal taxation 
rate and by the marginal loss of this tax advantage. This is illustrated 
in figure 2b which draws the average effective tax rate of the French 
legislation with respect to individual wage, depending on primary or 
secondary earner status. This constitutes a disincentive to participate 
to the labor market for secondary earners. 
The main objective of this paper is not to evaluate the joint taxation 
(even if the results allow understanding the impact of joint taxation 
on labor supply) but to use French joint taxation as a natural 
experiment to estimate the behavior of married women vis-à-vis the 
labor market. Indeed, the joint taxation system, associated with 
piecewise linear tax schedules, creates quasi-discontinuities in the 
2014/03 
16 
 
participation tax rate of married women, with the assignment variable 
being the taxable income per tax unit of the household without the 
potential wife’s wages. The empirical strategy is presented in section 
4. Before, section 3 presents the data base. 
 
3. Data 
This study is based on the analysis of an original data base. It 
consisted in a large sample of French tax returns for the 2006 
personal income tax of the 2005 income. Every year, the French Tax 
Agency (DGFiP - Direction Générale des Finances Publiques) 
assembles a large sample of tax returns, representative of the whole 
sample. To insure representativeness for all categories of population 
– even the less numerous – the data base is built by cluster sampling. 
The 35,105,856 income tax returns filed in 2006 were divided into 
8,424 clusters according to diverse economic, social and geographic 
criteria: the tax code, the level of taxable income, the principal source 
of income (salary, independent, returns on assets, pensions), the 
number of tax units and the local tax administration that first 
examined the income tax return. Each cluster is given a coefficient of 
selection w according to the number and the diversity of the tax 
returns it contains. Then a simple random sample is implemented on 
each cluster to select a proportion 1/w of the initial observations of 
the cluster. Differentiating the sampling ratio allows an emphasis 
upon very small socioeconomic categories, which could never be 
reflected in a representative sample if the tax return file were 
sampled proportionally. Specifically, the sampling weight can extend 
as far as w=1 (exhaustive cluster in the sample) for tax households 
with the highest incomes, which permits the inclusion of a significant 
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number of very wealthy households despite their small proportion 
among the French population as a whole. 
The size of the data base – it contains 497,920 tax returns for the 
2006 income tax – and its representativeness, are important assets of 
this data base. It allows obtaining significant results differentiated for 
different socio-economic categories. The present paper not only 
estimates overall elasticity of wife’s participation to the market, but 
also enables to compare the behavior of wives of different socio-
economic categories. Furthermore, the tax return files contains very 
precise figure of the income of the tax household: exact value for 
each member of the household, per type of income (pension, wages, 
unemployment benefit, self-employed income, financial asset returns, 
bonuses, real-estate, plus-value depending of the kind of asset 
sold…). It also contains information of the composition of the tax 
household: number, age and status (husband, wife, children, 
disabled…). In addition, there is a large number of other information 
linked with the huge number of tax deduction, reduction and credit. 
Nevertheless, this data base has also disadvantages. The variables not 
linked with the calculation of the income tax are missing. For 
example, there is no direct information on the level of education of 
the member of the households. However, the empirical strategy gets 
rid of the disadvantages and takes profit of the advantages of this 
data base. It is presented in more details in section 4. Neither is there 
information on wealth of households: there is no data on stock of 
capital. However, data on income, even capital income, are detailed 
in the base, and provide a good proxy for wealth. 
2014/03 
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For the 2006 assessment of 2005 incomes, the total amount of 
income declared was more than 823 billion euros, of which 63.2% 
were wages. The bottom 30% of households on the income scale 
earned 7.8% of all income. The top 30% of households on the 
income scale earned 62.0% of all income, and the middle 40% of 
households earned the remaining 30.2%. The top 10% of households 
on the income scale earned 34.0% of all income, and households in 
the upper 1% earned 9.9% of all income. Among the 35,105,856 tax 
households that declared their income in 2006, 12,399,237 were 
composed of married couples filing jointly. 
From the full sample, only married couples with a wife aged between 
30 and 60 are kept. The age limits are set to be sure to be outside the 
usual time for education or retirement. In addition, any household 
with self-employed income is dropped from the data base. Hence, all 
women may be only salaried, inactive or retired. The existence of 
social benefit loss due to participation may induce biases that are 
discussed in the empirical strategy section: the risk of bias is limited 
to estimation around the first threshold. Therefore, households 
around this first threshold are dropped from the data base when 
estimating general elasticity or elasticity for different households 
depending on their income, age or family composition. The final 
sample is composed of 93,728 including households around the first 
threshold and 82,821 observations excluding them. 
The wives are considered active if they earned during the year a 
positive amount of wage or unemployment benefit. This is not a 
perfect assessment of activity, but is altogether precise. The 
employment benefit considered comes from insurance-based system, 
under condition of active employment search controlled by the 
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unemployment agency. Therefore, women earning wages or 
unemployment benefit are actually active women. It may be that 
some women earning neither wages nor unemployment benefit are 
actually searching for jobs but are out right for unemployment 
benefit. However, this proportion is very small - unemployment 
benefits are quite generous in France in matters of length. Mainly, it 
only increases noise, and therefore standard errors in the estimations, 
but it does not induce estimate bias: this is more clearly explained in 
the empirical strategy section. 
Drawing the variations of the activity rate (among non-retired) with 
ages, family composition, income other than the wife’s wages, and 
non-wage income (figure 3), it appears that participation rate of 
wives is very irregular as those of husband is both very stable and 
very close to 100%. This sustains the identifying assumption 
presented and defended in section 4 that husband participate if they 
can then wives chose to participate or not. 
 
2014/03 
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Figure 3: Rates of participation to the labor market 
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Notes: Rates of participation of non-retired husbands and wives aged between 30 
and 60, with no self-employed income. 
Source: DGFiP, sample of French tax returns for 2006 income tax. 
 
This variation of wives’ participation to the workforce with regards 
to age is quite straightforward: it decreases. What is noticeable is that 
the decline of participation is substantial, and that it begins early. The 
first decrease is visible for wives aged between 45 and 50, far before 
retirement, but probably long after child bearing. Multiple 
explanations of this phenomenon may be given. First, it may be due 
to a composition effect, older wives live in wealthier households, and 
more may stop working because the need for more income is weaker. 
Furthermore, the need to preserve career opportunities in case of 
income shock during the life-cycle may be an incentive for younger 
wives to go on working even if they feel no immediate need for 
income. This last explanation deals with participation motives not 
directly linked with immediate earnings; there may be also motives 
more disconnected to earnings: stimulating interest for the job when 
young and lassitude at work increasing with age. In addition, older 
wives are less likely to be responsible of young children and 
therefore freer to arbitrage between income and leisure. Last, they are 
more likely to be married with a retired husband, which changed the 
arbitrage in favor of leisure. 
Looking at the impact of children, it appears that only the third child 
(and subsequent children) has a negative impact on participation of 
mothers, in accordance with the results of Angrist and Evans (1998) 
showing that it is a causal impact. Furthermore, the third and 
subsequent children have a stronger negative impact on their 
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mother’s participation when younger than three (public preschool in 
France begins at age three). The lower participation of mothers of 
children older than three, compared with mothers of less children, 
may come from direct impact of child care or from persistence of the 
effects of leaving the labor markets (e.g.: Lequien 2012). The others 
differences in participation may be explained by composition effects 
related to age. Mothers of one child under three participate more than 
mothers of one child over three, and they are likely to be younger. 
The oldest wives, with no more dependent children, take part of the 
no child category, explaining the lowest participation rate of these 
women. 
Last, the income effect – women in wealthier households 
participating less – is confirmed by figures plotting participation rate 
with respect to other household income and non-wage income. 
However, figure for other income (and less strongly for non-wage 
income) show inversed U curve instead of monotonously decreasing 
curves. This may come from a very low employability in the very 
bottom of the income distribution, generating discouragement to 
participate or very long term unemployment (considered as inactivity 
in the data base). Nevertheless, the increasing part of the curves 
represents the small minority of household represented in the data 
base. 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
As presented in section 2 describing the French joint income tax 
system, the taxation of the wife’s earnings depends on the other 
income of her tax household. More precisely, considering the 
2014/03 
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household’s taxable income per tax unit minus the potential wife’s 
wage as assignment variable, the wife’s participation tax rate meets 
discontinuity at the thresholds of the tax schedule, between the 
brackets with different marginal tax rates. This opens the opportunity 
of estimating married women participation elasticity with respect to 
taxes through regression discontinuity design. The aim of the present 
section is to describe and defend this identification strategy. 
The first issue consists in defining and calculating the participation 
tax rate. The very first euros earned by the wife undergo perfect 
discontinuity at the threshold between tax brackets. However, the 
participation decision is not made only on the very first euros earned 
per year. Furthermore, potential wage that may be earned if she 
participates depends on her productivity, which is known neither for 
those participating nor those inactive. There is no information on 
work duration in the data (except for low income through earned 
income tax credit) and I cannot know if a given annual wage 
corresponds to part time work at high wage rate or full time work at 
low wage rate. In top of that, the identification strategy needs an 
exogenous participation tax rate as regressor. Therefore, a 
counterfactual arbitrary wage is introduced for calculating the 
participation tax rates. In addition, the dependent variable is 
participation (at least very small) or non-participation at all to the 
workforce, and hence the participation tax rates should concern the 
first quantum of work which may be supplied by married women. 
The counterfactual arbitrary wage should be small: it is set to half 
time at the minimum wage. 
Assuming that all information of tax return keep alike (particularly 
tax deduction, reduction and credit) but that linked with the actual 
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wife’s wage, I calculate income tax of the household if the wife does 
not work and if she works for the counterfactual wage. This allows 
calculating the participation tax rate. Figure 4 draws the theoretical 
participation tax rate (according to tax laws) and the actual average 
participation tax rate (calculated on the data base) along the 
distribution of taxable income per tax unit minus the potential wife's 
wage. 
 
Figure 4: Participation tax rate along the income distribution 
 
Notes: The participation tax rate is obtained by comparing counterfactual income 
taxes of the household if the wife does not work and if she works half time at 
minimum wage, all other characteristics of the household keeping alike. 
Source: DGFiP, sample of French tax returns for 2006 income tax. 
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The regression discontinuity design opportunity appears clearly from 
this figure. The participation tax rates, stable inside the tax brackets,  
increase very steeply around the threshold between brackets. As 
similar household in the middle of the brackets face the same 
participation tax rate, similar households around the thresholds face 
very different participation tax rate. Actual participation tax rates are 
very close to theoretical ones in the lower part of the distribution of 
taxable income, but there is more noise for the upper part. This noise 
is due to some households with tax reductions that could not be 
totally reimbursed on the tax without the wife's wages, and which are 
partially reimbursed on the taxation of the wife's earnings. This is 
why the actual rate is lower than the theoretical one. This appears 
mainly for high-middle income because tax reductions are 
extensively used by higher incomes and the very top income 
households have enough income tax due to get their full tax 
reductions. This noise may awaken the significance of the results but 
does not biased the results as tax reduction and credit do not change 
the position of the household with regards to the threshold (it is 
imputed on the tax due after calculation). What is important for the 
estimation is that the exogenous steep increase of the participation 
tax rates remains at the thresholds. 
The main assumption for the validity of this identification strategy is 
that the position of the couple vis-à-vis the discontinuity threshold is 
actually exogenous. This means that the assignment variable – here 
the taxable income per tax unit minus the wife’s wage – is not 
manipulated by the households in order to be just under or just above 
the threshold. Rather, according to Lee and Lemieux (2010) concept 
of fuzzy regression discontinuity design, the method is still unbiased 
as long as this manipulation is imperfect. However, as shown by 
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Saez (2010), manipulation of this assignment variable would lead to 
bunching around the tax threshold. Yet, as shown by figure 5 – 
drawing the density of the distribution of taxable income per tax unit 
with and without the wife’s wage, along with the Kernel of this 
distribution – such bunching does not exist in the French case. 
 
Figure 5: Kernel of taxable income distribution 
 
 
Notes: The histogram plots the distribution of taxable income per tax unit (with or 
without wife’s wages) with bins of 500 euros. The curve plots a kernel density of 
the simulated distribution with a bandwidth of 150 euros which fits the histogram. 
The vertical lines indicate the tax thresholds. 
Source: DGFiP, sample of French tax returns for 2006 income tax 
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Furthermore, Carbonnier et al. (2014) tested a large number of 
households characteristics around French tax thresholds, among 
which ages, sex, marital status, household income, wages, ratio of 
wages over household's income. Neither were there discontinuities at 
the tax thresholds. This is additional evidence against manipulation 
because manipulation, even fuzzy, would sort household around 
threshold between those able or less able to manipulate, generating 
discontinuities in the characteristics of households. 
On top of these empirical evidences, there exists some other 
argument that no manipulation of taxable income minus the wife’s 
wage is done with regards to the tax thresholds. Even if inequality 
within couples has decreased progressively since the middle of the 
twentieth century, the wife being the secondary earner remains a 
valid hypothesis because of remaining inequalities between men and 
women relative to the labor supply, for causes both internal and 
external to the couples. Among the external causes, the gender wage 
gap is still significant (e.g. Altonji and Blank 1999, Blau and Kahn 
2000, Bertrand et al. 2009, Bertrand 2011); it induces both a larger 
income and a more significant prospective career from the husband's 
participation in the workforce, which reinforce his primary earner 
status. From an internal point of view, the inequalities in earner 
status between the wife and the husband may be seen through their 
behavior in relation to child care. Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008) and 
Baker et al. (2008) show that child care costs or allowances have an 
important influence on the supply of married women's labor, and 
Piketty (1998) shows conversely that allocations reserved for non-
working parents with children are powerful inducements for women 
with children to leave the workforce. Moreover, Angrist and Evans 
(1998) find a significant impact of the third child on the participation 
 29 
   
of the wife in the workforce, but no impact on the participation of the 
husband. This highlights the fact that the participation in the 
workforce of the wife is the adjustment variable in households, 
which means that a majority of couples considers the wife to be the 
secondary earner. 
In addition, the constraints related to the job market have a 
differential impact upon each spouse. From the point of view of 
employment at the extensive margin - married women's workforce 
participation - the primary earner is simultaneously subject to internal 
and external pressures to participate in the workforce. The internal 
pressure arises from the fact that the couple needs income, and the 
external pressure stems from the social stigma if he does not 
participate in the workforce. From both the internal and external 
point of view, the secondary income earner has more freedom to 
choose whether or not to participate in the workforce. Thus I assume 
that the primary earner always participates in the workforce and 
works if he can, while the secondary income earner chooses to 
participate, or not. This hypothesis is confirmed by descriptive 
statistics of figure 3: there is almost no variation of the participation 
rate of non-retired husband (which is very close to 1) but large 
variations of the participation rate of wives (which is significantly 
lower than one). This is the hypothesis advanced by Kleven et al. 
(2009) in their modeling of employment among couples. They offer 
the additional hypothesis that the imperfections of the job market 
prevent the secondary income earner from varying their employment 
at the intensive margin. 
The second hypothesis of the present estimation strategy consists in 
extending this last hypothesis to both members of the couple. Indeed, 
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the majority of salaried workers are very constrained in the hours 
they work and cannot deliberately choose to vary their employment 
at the intensive margin. Donni (2007) remarked that it is very rare for 
French married men of working age not to work, or fail to seek work. 
In addition he noted that working husbands often work full-time. 
Similarly, Bourguigon and Magnac (1990) concluded that there is 
little flexibility in the duration of work, and all studies of 
employment at the intensive margin find low elasticities, with the 
exception of very high incomes. Feldstein (1995) uses a panel of tax 
returns coinciding with the United States income tax reform of 1986 
to measure the elasticity of taxable income, which he finds to be 
greater than unity; however, this study is directed only to very high 
incomes and does not control for the ability to select between salaried 
remunerations or dividends that can operate in certain cases of high 
income. Saez (2003) separately evaluates the elasticities of taxable 
income and income from salaries: he finds that taxes have an 
important impact on taxable income, but an insignificant and more or 
less negligible impact on income from salaries. He explains this 
through the rigidities of the job market: salaried workers (with the 
exception of the highest incomes) have no real prospect of modifying 
the amount of time they spend at work, in other words, they have no 
control over their employment at the intensive margin. 
Summarizing the hypotheses of the identification strategy, the 
primary earner of a couple, in practice the husband, works if he can 
and reports an income over which he has no power of decision. Then, 
taking into consideration this already available income plus non-
earned income and the participation tax rate, the secondary earner, in 
practice the wife, decides whether or not to work. The secondary 
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earner's decision has no influence on the employment of the primary 
earner. 
Regression discontinuity design classically consists in regression of 
the interest variable (the wife’s participation to the workforce) on the 
assignment variable (the taxable income per tax unit minus wife’s 
wage) and on a variable indicating the position with regards to the 
discontinuity (the participation tax rate). 
The dependent variable is the activity status: participating or not. As 
mentioned earlier, it is not possible to know if the wife works full or 
part time. The activity status if participation if she earned at least a 
positive amount of wage or unemployment benefit during the year. 
As explained in section 3, this is very close to actual activity. The 
only error comes from very long-term unemployed still searching 
jobs. However, these active wives considered inactive for regressions 
only increase the standard errors and do not induce estimation bias 
but since this kind of women are not concentrated one side or the 
other of the thresholds. Indeed, it has been shown that the households 
cannot manipulate there position with regards to the thresholds. Even 
if they could – the proportion of such wives being discontinuous at 
the thresholds between marginal tax rates – it would mean that this 
status is not independent from the wives’ will and is therefore actual 
inactivity. 
The main explanatory variable, the position with regards to the 
discontinuities is given by the participation tax rate, as shown by 
figure 4. The participation tax rate is preferred to simple dummy of 
the position with regards to the threshold because it allows 
calculating elasticities of labor supply, and it is nonetheless 
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exogenous. This participation tax rate include the ``prime pour 
l’emploi’’ (PPE, the French earned income tax credit) which can 
change due to the wives’ participation decision, and the other tax 
benefit, which do not changed. However, the loss of PPE due to 
wife’s participation is unlikely: it would necessitate that the husband 
is actually salaried around minimum wage (to take benefit of PPE) 
and the household as large non-wage income that place them just at 
the frontier of the ceiling of overall income to be eligible to PPE. 
Whatever, the potential loss of PPE is taken into account for 
calculating the participation tax rates. 
Social benefits are not considered in the participation tax rate 
because the information lacks in the data base. However, due to the 
estimation strategy, they do not imply estimation bias since they are 
not discontinuous at the threshold between marginal tax rate 
brackets. The only threshold for whose there may be some issue is 
the first one, as some social benefits are conditional to be untaxed. 
The untaxed status does not depend on the amount of income tax 
actually paid, but on the tax due before imputation of any reduction 
of credit; it therefore correspond exactly to the first threshold. This 
problem is tackled by dropping households around this first threshold 
for all regression but the one specifically around this first threshold. 
This last estimation should be interpreted with caution because the 
estimate around the first threshold is overestimated. Indeed, 
discontinuity of the participation tax rate used for this regression – 
and this regression only – is underestimated because it does not take 
into account the loss of social benefit. 
In addition to these main covariates, some controls are used. The first 
one is the taxable income per consumption unit. The second is the set 
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of dummies: the control is done by cluster (clustering is presented in 
table 2). The controls include the wife’s and husband’s ages, the 
number of dependent children in the tax household, the presence of 
children aged under 3, the real estate and financial asset returns and 
the position with regards to the tax thresholds. The interest of such 
way of controlling is that it allow for different impact of the controls 
for different kind of households. For example, the non-wage income 
impact on participation is not the same for young or older wives. 
 
Table 2: Categorization of households 
 
Note: SMIC is the minimum wage in France, its annual value for full-time work in 
2005 is used as a unit of measurement for income. 
 
Determining 
parameters 
Number of 
categories 
Detail of the 
Categories 
Wife’s age 3 30-40, 40-50, 50-60 
Husband’s age 5 < 40, 40-50, > 50, retired 
Dependent 
children 
3 0, 1, 2, 3 and more 
Child under 3 2 yes, no 
Real estate income 2 yes, no 
Financial asset 
income 
4 0, < 0.5 SMIC, > 0.5 SMIC, > 
wages 
Closest tax 
threshold 
6 7 marginal rates and 6 thresholds 
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However, it is not possible to control for the level of education, as 
this information is not declared to the tax service. Other 
characteristics of the household and endogamy give a kind of proxy 
for this, but imperfect. Nevertheless, this lack of control generates 
only noise (and increase of standard errors) but no estimation bias in 
regression discontinuity design, unless there is manipulation of the 
assignment variable: it would necessitate that among household with 
similar socio-economic characteristic and similar taxable income 
without the wife's wage, the taxable income without wife's wages of 
household with more educated wives be just below the threshold and 
those of less educated wives just above. Not only it is not plausible, 
but both empirical and theoretical arguments for non-manipulation of 
taxable income without wife's wage around tax thresholds are 
presented above. 
Summarizing, the actual estimation consists in regressing the logit of 
the participation on the logarithm of the participation tax rate (one 
minus the participation tax rate), the logarithm of the taxable income 
per tax unit minus wife’s wage, the logarithm of the taxable income 
per consumption units minus wife’s wage and the set of control 
dummies. The estimates are evaluated at the maximum of likelihood. 
In addition, robustness test are implemented. The first one consists in 
adding another covariate. This added covariate is the product of the 
logarithm of the participation retention rate and the logarithm of the 
taxable income per consumption unit minus the wife’s wage. In that 
case, the regression equation is given by equation 1. 
     (1) 
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where π is the wives’ participation rate, R the participation retention 
rate, A the taxable income per tax unit minus wife’s wage, Y the 
taxable income per consumption unit minus wife’s wage and the Di 
the different dummies of the clustering control. Hence, the estimate 
of the elasticity of wife’s participation to the retention rate is given 
by equation 2 and its standard error by equation 3. 
    
   (2) 
 
           (3) 
where  is the mean of Y, σY its standard error, and σij the coefficients 
of the variance/covariance matrix of the regression. 
The second robustness test is done by changing the logarithm of the 
participation retention rate by its absolute value. In that case, the 
estimate is no more elasticity of wives’ participation but the semi-
elasticity of wives’ participation with respect to the retention rate. 
The estimates out of each kind of regression are the same, which 
validates the strategy. Furthermore, a large number of regressions are 
run on different subsamples. This allows understanding the 
behavioral differences between different categories of households. 
 
5. Results 
First, the regressions on the full-sample (but observations around the 
first threshold) are run (table 3). The results are very close from one 
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specification to another, and all are very significant. This is also the 
case for the regressions on the different subsamples. This 
significance and coherence between different specifications reinforce 
the confidence in the results. Looking at the value of the results, the 
elasticity of wife’s participation to the workforce with respect to their 
participation retention rate is actually very high, around seven. This 
estimate is sensibly larger than those previously found in the 
literature. However, it is mainly driven by behavior of household of 
the very bottom-end of the distribution, that is not fully accounted for 
in other estimations. The French tax system with discontinuities for 
very low income: first two thresholds stand at only 4,412 and 8,677 
euros a year per tax unit. This would be discussed more extensively 
in the conclusion section. 
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Table 3: Elasticities of wife's participation in the workforce, global average 
 Number of Base estimates Crossed estimates Semi-elasticity 
 observations (1) (2) (3) 
Overall sample 82,821 7.082*** (0.010) 6.466*** (2.393) 7.846*** (0.011) 
Regression discontinuity design per threshold 
Threshold 1 10,907 34.284*** (0.139) 34.365*** (0.752) 34.078*** (0.141) 
Threshold 2 11,565 15.067*** (0.033) 17.363* (9.570) 15.172*** (0.034) 
Threshold 3 21,685 7.634*** (0.015) 8.039** (3.151) 8.220*** (0.016) 
Threshold 4 20,665 2.646*** (0.012) 2.618*** (0.287) 2.901*** (0.013) 
Threshold 5 13,136 2.706*** (0.032) 2.709*** (0.071) 3.015*** (0.036) 
Threshold 6 15,770 1.884*** (0.028) 1.820*** (0.198) 2.319*** (0.034) 
Notes: ``Base estimates'', column (1), gives elasticity of wife's participation with respect to participation retention rate (one minus 
participation tax rate) from the logit regression – estimated at the maximum of likelihood – of the participation to the logarithm of the 
retention rate and the logarithm of the assignment variable (the taxable income per tax unit minus the wife’s wage, with cluster controls plus 
the logarithm of the taxable income per consumption unit minus the wife’s wage; ``crossed estimates'', column (2), gives result from the 
same regression with addition as regressor of the product of the logarithm of the participation retention rate and the logarithm of taxable 
income per consumption unit minus the wife’s wage; ``Semi-elasticity'', column (3), gives semi-elasticity of wife's participation with respect 
to participation retention rate (it is the same regression as column (1) with the actual retention rate instead of its logarithm). Standard errors 
in parentheses. ***: significant at the threshold of 1%; **: significant at the threshold of 5%; *: significant at the threshold of 10%. 
Source: DGFiP, sample of French tax returns for 2006 income tax 
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Table 3 also shows the results around each threshold, consisting of 
different regression discontinuity designs separately run around each 
discontinuity. The elasticity appears huge around the first threshold. 
However, as explained in the presentation of the identification 
strategy, it may be biased by the discontinuity of some social benefit 
around this first threshold. Still, it shows that the sum of joint 
taxation plus local social benefits conditioned by non-taxed status 
generates an important disincentive for women on the lower-end of 
the distribution to participate to the labor market. 
Elasticities estimated around other thresholds are also large – even if 
substantially less. Furthermore, the elasticities are substantially lower 
for upper thresholds. This is not only due to the decrease of the 
retention rate (inducing larger relative change of the retention rate for 
the same absolute change of the retention rate) because the same 
decline with the rise in the tax schedule may be observed with semi-
elasticities. This could be linked to the standard of living of the 
households, or more generally to the level of income and wealth. 
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Table 4: Elasticities of wife's participation in the workforce, per income 
 Nb of 
Obs. 
Base estimates 
(1) 
Crossed estimates 
(2) 
Semi-elasticity 
(3) 
Income per unit of consumption without wife’s wages 
< 10,000 euros 16,114 16.524*** (0.036) 18.228*** (4.285) 16.615*** (0.036) 
< 25,000 euros 40,557 5.367*** (0.011) 4.983*** (0.882) 5.813*** (0.012) 
< 50,000 euros 14,202 2.727*** (0.026) 2.835*** (0.493) 3.209*** (0.030) 
< 100,000 euros 4,584 1.276*** (0.052) 1.277*** (0.108) 1.642*** (0.064) 
< 250,000 euros 3,659 0.913*** (0.126) 0.949*** (0.187) 1.202*** (0.155) 
< 500,000 euros 1,049 0.322 (0.328) 0.325 (0.345) 0.428 (0.395) 
< 1,000,000 euros 458 0.914 (0.580) 0.908 (0.685) 1.193* (0.705) 
> 1,000,000 euros 267 5.012*** (1.771) 5.246** (2.223) 6.629*** (2.375) 
Asset returns     
No real estate income     
No financial income 40,856 7.822*** (0.012) 7.553*** (2.757) 8.477*** (0.013) 
< ½ SMIC 19,277 4.585*** (0.018) 4.399*** (1.193) 5.168*** (0.019) 
> ½ SMIC 2,368 1.141*** (0.236) 1.239 (1.388) 1.349*** (0.087) 
> wages 1,488 2.397*** (0.172) 2.385*** (0.186) 2.841*** (0.201) 
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Real estate income     
No financial income 6,328 6.731*** (0.046) 6.590** (2.424) 7.721*** (0.053) 
< ½ SMIC 8,929 4.493*** (0.037) 4.213*** (0.905) 5.140*** (0.042) 
> ½ SMIC 1,936 1.576*** (0.085) 1.504*** (0.246) 2.050*** (0.105) 
> wages 1,638 1.700*** (0.134) 1.508 (1.261) 2.078*** (0.155) 
 
 
Notes: ``Base estimates'', column (1), gives elasticity of wife's participation with respect to participation retention rate (one 
minus participation tax rate) from the logit regression – estimated at the maximum of likelihood – of the participation to the 
logarithm of the retention rate and the logarithm of the assignment variable (the taxable income per tax unit minus the wife’s 
wage, with cluster controls plus the logarithm of the taxable income per consumption unit minus the wife’s wage; ``crossed 
estimates'', column (2), gives result from the same regression with addition as regressor of the product of the logarithm of the 
participation retention rate and the logarithm of taxable income per consumption unit minus the wife’s wage; ``Semi-
elasticity'', column (3), gives semi-elasticity of wife's participation with respect to participation retention rate (it is the same 
regression as column (1) with the actual retention rate instead of its logarithm). Standard errors in parentheses. ***: significant 
at the threshold of 1%; **: significant at the threshold of 5%; *: significant at the threshold of 10%. 
Source: DGFiP, sample of French tax returns for 2006 income tax 
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This assumption is tested with estimations of elasticities per level of 
income per consumption unit (pre-woman wage) and per level of 
asset returns (table 4). Both confirm that the elasticity declines 
strongly with the standard of living. Furthermore, looking at very 
high level of income (both in general and in terms of asset returns), it 
appears that the elasticity increase at the very upper-end of the 
distribution, giving birth to a U-curve. The declining part of the U-
curve may be explained by the interest of the jobs available if 
participating. Due to assortative mating, women at the bottom-end of 
the distribution can pretend to jobs bearing no intrinsic motivation. 
For them, the only reason to work is to earn money and they are 
therefore very sensitive to fiscal incentives. Women upper in the 
distribution can pretend to jobs interesting by themselves – and better 
paid – so their decision to work is less determined by taxation. For 
the very upper-end of the distribution, the budgetary constraints of 
the household are totally relaxed, so the wife’s have more 
opportunity to decide not to work and may be more sensitive to fiscal 
incentive. 
Following, it may be informative to look at difference of behavior 
depending on age (table 5). If considering only couples with similar 
ages (the majority of couples), it appears that the elasticity 
unambiguously increased with respect to age. This can be easily 
understood through two arguments. First, younger women decision 
has not only impact on its present income and well-being, but also 
modifies its perspective of career, mainly by the in-job accumulation 
of human capital. Hence, the decision to work depends less on 
present taxation and more future opportunities, lowering the 
elasticity of labor supply in the extensive margins with respect to the 
participation tax rate. Second, older women may be more tired to 
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work, which may decrease the non-financial motivation to work, and 
therefore increasing the importance of taxation in the choice 
regarding participation. 
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Table 5: Elasticities of wife's participation in the workforce, per family composition 
 Nb of 
Obs. 
Base estimates 
(1) 
Crossed estimates 
(2) 
Semi-elasticity 
(3) 
Age categories 
Wife: 30-40     
Husband < 40 16,259 5.659*** (0.018) 5.183** (2.463) 6.111*** (0.019) 
Husband 40-50 7,605 8.011*** (0.035) 7.269* (4.230) 8.707*** (0.038) 
Husband > 50 607 12.897*** (0.225) 11.683*** (4.317) 13.926*** (0.242) 
Husband retired 354 11.085*** (0.238) 9.827 (8.993) 11.625*** (0.248) 
Wife: 40-50     
Husband < 40 1,762 7.990*** (0.079) 7.096** (3.145) 8.639*** (0.085) 
Husband 40-50 21,427 6.262*** (0.019) 5.905** (2.319) 6.967*** (0.021) 
Husband > 50 7,221 7.598*** (0.033) 6.966** (2.676) 8.449*** (0.037) 
Husband retired 1,788 10.893*** (0.080) 10.263*** (3.619) 11.563*** (0.085) 
Wife: 50-60     
Husband < 40 66 18.708*** (0.778) 18.680*** (0.834) 20.308*** (0.849) 
Husband 40-50 1,500 7.423*** (0.084) 7.412*** (0.111) 8.084*** (0.091) 
Husband > 50 15,326 7.081*** (0.025) 6.521*** (1.242) 8.038*** (0.028) 
2014/03 
44 
 
Husband retired 8,906 9.827*** (0.036) 8.613** (3.725) 10.787*** (0.039) 
Number of children     
No child under 3     
No child 20,778 7.875*** (0.020) 7.147*** (1.552) 8.770*** (0.022) 
One child 12,381 7.277*** (0.024) 6.684*** (1.878) 8.065*** (0.026) 
Two children 17,619 6.272*** (0.019) 5.826*** (1.787) 6.956*** (0.021) 
Three or more 17,197 8.322*** (0.029) 8.575** (4.396) 9.096*** (0.031) 
Child under 3     
One child 2,128 4.976*** (0.055) 4.827*** (1.713) 5.633*** (0.061) 
Two children 5,349 5.344*** (0.095) 4.585** (2.198) 5.796*** (0.032) 
Three or more 7,369 9.780*** (0.053) 9.623* (5.390) 10.451*** (0.056) 
 
Notes: ``Base estimates'', column (1), gives elasticity of wife's participation with respect to participation retention rate (one minus 
participation tax rate) from the logit regression – estimated at the maximum of likelihood – of the participation to the logarithm of the 
retention rate and the logarithm of the assignment variable (the taxable income per tax unit minus the wife’s wage, with clus ter controls plus 
the logarithm of the taxable income per consumption unit minus the wife’s wage; ``crossed estimates'', column (2), gives result from the 
same regression with addition as regressor of the product of the logarithm of the participation retention rate and the logarithm of taxable 
income per consumption unit minus the wife’s wage; ``Semi-elasticity'', column (3), gives semi-elasticity of wife's participation with respect 
to participation retention rate (it is the same regression as column (1) with the actual retention rate instead of its logarithm). Standard errors 
in parentheses. ***: significant at the threshold of 1%; **: significant at the threshold of 5%; *: significant at the threshold of 10%. 
Source: DGFiP, sample of French tax returns for 2006 income tax 
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In addition, the elasticity of participation increases with respect to the 
age difference within the couple – wathever the sign of this 
difference. This should cover intrinsic behavior differences between 
women choosing an husband of their age and choosing older or 
younger husband. However, it is difficult to link them to economic 
issues. In contrary, the very high sensitivity to tax incentive  of 
women of retired husband may be more easily understood. The 
working status of their husband create a strong incentive to meet him 
in inactivity, that may only be counteracted if work is really 
remunerating. 
Last, it is possible to look at the influence of children (table 5). 
Whatever, their age, the third and subsequent children not only 
increase the rate of inactivity but also increase the activity choice 
dependence on taxation. However, the first two children seem to 
have the opposite effect (lowering elasticity). However, this may 
come from composition effect, there are more older women among 
those without dependent children, and they are more sensitive to tax 
incentive more because of their age than because they have no 
children. Yet, this composition effect cannot explain why mother of 
less than two very young children (under three) are less sensitive to 
taxation than other women, even than the youngest wives. In that 
matter, the responsibility over very young children increases the need 
for income, lowering the possibility of inactivity. Indeed, those 
mothers of young children have very large rate of activity. The same 
explanation may be used to understand the high elasticity of older 
wives: the absence of children – and therefore of responsibility over 
other people – diminishes the need for income and relax the 
budgetary constraints. This has the consequences of freeing the 
choice over participation, which become more depending on taxes. 
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6. Conclusion and comments 
The present article exploits the French joint income tax system and a 
large tax returns data base to implement a regression discontinuity 
design for estimating the elasticity of married women's participation 
in the workforce with respect to the rate of income tax. The negative 
impact of participation tax rate is found very strong in general, over 
unity. Only the upper middle class presents low sensitivity to the 
participation tax rate. Apart from the very bottom-end of the 
distribution of income, the order of magnitude is in line with 
previous results in the literature, above but around unity. The survey 
of Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) presents mean estimates slightly 
under unity, but estimations focusing on joint taxation in different 
countries found results above unity. With natural experiments 
estimations based on reforms of the joint taxation system, three 
studies found that the elasticity is substantially larger than one. On a 
1948 US reform, LaLumia (2008) estimates a strong impact on 
women activity of the reforms. She has difficulty to estimate 
elasticity properly because she does not know the exact change in 
participation tax rate. Nevertheless, bounding hypothesis shows that 
it is clearly larger than two. On the 1971 Swedish reform Selin 
(2009) finds elasticities from 0.46 to 1.77 for the upper-end of the 
income distribution. On the 2005 Czech reform, Kalíšková (2013) 
finds elasticities between 1 and 4. 
The results of the present estimation find that elasticity increases 
with age and difference in age within the couple. It is very high for 
wives of retired. From the family composition point of view, it 
appears that only the third and subsequent children strongly increase 
the elasticity. The first two do not, and even decrease it substantially 
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when young (under three). Concerning the impact of income, a U-
curve is found. The upper part of this U-curve is consistent with the 
results of Gruber and Saez (2002) and Selin (2009), the bottom part 
is consistent with those of Kalíšková (2013). 
Furthermore, the bottom of the distribution presents very large 
sensitivity to tax incentive. This result is original because other 
estimations fail to take into account the very bottom end of the 
income distribution. The French tax system allows such estimation 
thanks to discontinuities in the tax schedule for very low income: the 
first two thresholds stand at only 4,412 and 8,677 euros a year per tax 
unit. This result sheds light on the strong disincentive effect of the U-
curve of marginal tax rates when the tax and transfers system is 
based on families. This is particularly problematic for France, where 
the income tax is family based with large discontinuities at the 
bottom and a large share of social benefit are conditioned to a non-
taxed status. This induces a very low participation rate of wives with 
low socio-economic status. As non-participation increases, so does 
the difficulties to come back to work if necessary; it increases the 
dependency of married women to their husband, particularly in 
families at the bottom of income distribution. 
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